

1 Introduction

Migration raises high hopes and deep fears: hopes for the *migrants* themselves, for whom migration often embodies the promise of a better future. At the same time, migration can be a dangerous undertaking, and every year thousands die in attempts to cross borders. Family and friends are often left behind in uncertainty. If a migrant fails to find a job or is expelled, it can mean the loss of all family savings. However, if successful, migration can mean a stable source of family income, decent housing, the ability to cure an illness, resources to set up a business and the opportunity for children to study.

In receiving societies, migration is equally met with ambiguity. Settler societies, nascent empires and bustling economies have generally welcomed immigrants, as they fill labour shortages, boost population growth and stimulate businesses and trade. However, particularly in times of economic crisis and conflict, immigrants are often the first to be blamed for problems, and face discrimination, *racism* and sometimes violence. This particularly applies to migrants who look, behave or believe differently than majority populations.

Migration and the resulting ethnic and racial diversity are amongst the most emotive subjects in contemporary societies. While global migration rates have remained relatively stable over the past half a century, the political salience of migration has increased. For origin societies, the departure of people raise concern about a *brain drain*, but it also creates the hope that the money and knowledge migrants obtain abroad can foster development back home. For destination societies, the arrival of migrant groups can fundamentally change the social, cultural and political fabric of societies, particularly in the longer run.

This became apparent during the US presidential election of 2016. During the election campaign, Donald J. Trump promised voters that he would build a border wall to prevent Mexican immigration. Trump stoked up fear of Mexican immigrants by saying “They are bringing drugs. They are bringing crime. They are rapists”. At campaign rallies, Trump also tapped into anti-Islam sentiment, linking Muslim immigration to terrorism and expressing a desire for a Muslim registry. In January 2017 the Trump administration introduced a controversial ban on the entry of passport holders from seven predominantly Muslim countries. Although this policy met social and legal resistance, this reflected a campaign promise of a ‘Muslim ban’, based on reducing perceived security risks and curbing refugee migration to the US.

In Europe, the growing political salience of migration is reflected in the rise of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam parties and a subsequent move to the right of the entire political spectrum on migration and diversity issues (see Davis 2012). Parties like the Front National in France, the Lega Nord in Italy, and the Freedom Parties of Austria and the Netherlands have been established features of the political landscape for over two decades now. Although in most countries such parties have not been able to gain majorities, they are perceived as a major electoral threat by established parties, and their influence on debates is therefore larger than their voting share may suggest, as they tempt rival parties to adopt similar positions on immigration and diversity in order to retain voters.

In Europe, fears of mass migration came to a boiling point in 2015, when more than one million refugees and asylum seekers from Syria and elsewhere crossed the Mediterranean Sea. Concerns about immigration also played a central important role in the 2016 *Brexit* referendum, with 52 per cent of the voters supporting leaving the European Union (EU). In the lead-up to the vote, Nigel Farage's United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) stoked up fears of mass immigration. Anti-immigration parties from across Europe have argued that free intra-EU mobility undermines national sovereignty, and that abolishing free movement – or leaving the EU – is the only way to regain control over what is portrayed as unfettered migration.

The increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of immigrant-receiving societies creates dilemmas for societies and governments in finding ways to respond to these changes. Young people of immigrant background are protesting against discrimination and exclusion from the societies in which they had grown up – and often been born – and claim their right to equal opportunities in obtaining jobs, education and practising their religion. Some politicians and elements of the media shift the blame to the migrants themselves, claiming that they fail to integrate by deliberately maintaining distinct cultures and religions, and that immigration has become a threat to security and social cohesion.

Migration is an inherently divisive political issue. There is little evidence that migrants take away jobs or that migration is the fundamental cause of deteriorating working conditions, welfare provisions and public services. In fact, most evidence suggests that migration has positive impacts on overall growth, innovation and the vitality of economies and societies. For the most part, the growth of diversity and *transnationalism* is seen as a beneficial process, because it can help overcome the violence and destructiveness that characterized the era of nationalism – this was for instance a major motive behind the creation of the EU.

On the other hand, the benefits of migration are not equally distributed across members of destination societies. Businesses and high-income groups tend to reap the primary benefits from the labour and services delivered by migrants. Lower income groups, who have often experienced a deterioration of working conditions, real wages and social security as a result of economic deregulation and *globalization*, enjoy few, if any, direct economic benefits from migration, while they are often most directly confronted with the social and cultural change that migration is bringing about. Some politicians are therefore tempted to rally support by blaming the most vulnerable members of society – migrant workers and asylum seekers – for problems not of their making.

Beyond the usual allegations that migrants take away jobs and benefits, and undercut wages, migration has been increasingly linked to security concerns. On the one hand, this reflects genuine worries about the involvement of small fractions of immigrant and immigrant-origin populations in extremist violence and terrorism. International migration is sometimes directly or indirectly linked to conflict. Events such as 9/11 (the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC) as well as the attacks by Islamist radicals in Europe and elsewhere involved immigrants or their offspring. This can lead to useful debates about how to counter such violence and how to prevent the marginalization and radicalization of immigrant populations.

It becomes more problematic when such attacks are used to stoke up xenophobia for political gain, by representing migration as a fundamental threat to the security, identity and cultural integrity of destination societies. This has led to the frequent portrayal of

migrants and asylum seekers as criminals, rapists and terrorists, or as ‘foreign hordes’ plotting a takeover by bringing in foreign cultures and religions such as Islam. Anti-migrant sentiment and migrant scapegoating by politicians and opinion makers have created a climate where far-right and racist attacks have flared up. It is in this political climate that extreme-right violence has proliferated, such as the attacks on New Zealand mosques in 2019, with a danger of provoking counterreactions by Islamist radicals. In this way, violence by white *supremacists* and Islamist radicals can feed into each other in a dangerous vicious circle.

This is by no means a uniquely Western phenomenon. As migration is globalizing, the cultural, social and economic changes that inevitably result from the arrival and settlement of large groups of migrants are deeply affecting societies around the world, often leading to polarization between social and economic groups opposing and favouring large-scale immigration. Oil economies in the Gulf region have the highest immigration rates in the world, and their economies have become structurally dependent on foreign labour. Lack of worker rights, prohibition of unions and fear of deportation leave migrant workers no choice other than to accept exploitative conditions. In Japan and Korea too, politicians often express fears of loss of ethnic homogeneity through immigration. The government of multiracial Malaysia has regularly blamed immigrants for crime and other social problems, and announced ‘crackdowns’ against irregular migrants whenever there are economic slowdowns. African countries have among the most restrictive immigration regimes in the world, and racist attacks and mass expulsions have regularly occurred in countries such as South Africa, Nigeria and Libya.

Migration is such a politically divisive issue because it is directly linked to issues of national identity and sovereignty. However, as migrants stay longer they become an increasingly permanent feature of societies, while economies have come to increasingly depend on continuous inflows of lower and higher migrant labour. Time and again, this has compelled governments to come to terms with such new realities by creating facilities for the legalization, integration and naturalization of migrants. As settlement takes place and migrants claim their place as new members of society, this is almost bound to create political tension and, sometimes, conflict.

Migration in an age of globalization

This book is about contemporary migrations and the way they are changing societies. The perspective is international: large-scale movements of people arise from processes of global integration. Migrations are not isolated phenomena: movements of commodities, capital and ideas almost always give rise to movements of people, and vice versa. Global cultural interchange, facilitated by improved transport and the proliferation of print and electronic media, can also increase migration aspirations by diffusing images and information about life and opportunities in other places. International migration therefore ranks as one of the most important factors in global change – both as a manifestation and a further cause of such change.

There are several reasons to expect the age of migration to endure: increasing levels of education and specialization combined with the growing complexity of labour markets will continue to generate demand for all sorts of lower- and higher-skilled migrant labour; inequalities in wealth and job opportunities will continue to motivate people to move in

search of better living standards; while violent conflict and political oppression in some countries is likely to fuel future refugee movements.

Migration is not just – or even mainly – a reaction to difficult conditions at home: it is primarily driven by the search for better opportunities and preferred lifestyles elsewhere. Some migrants experience abuse or exploitation, but most benefit and are able to improve their long-term life perspectives through migrating. Conditions are sometimes tough for migrants but are often preferable to limited opportunities at home – otherwise migration would not continue.

According to the Population Division of the United Nations, the global number of international migrants (defined as people living outside their native country for at least a year) has grown from about 93 million in 1960 to 170 million in 2000 and from there further to an estimated 258 million in 2017. Although this seems a staggering increase, in relative terms international migration has remained remarkably stable, fluctuating around levels of around 3 per cent of the world population (see Figure 1.1).

These facts challenge popular narratives of rapidly accelerating migration, as the number of international migrants has grown at a roughly equal pace with overall global population since 1960. Some researchers have argued that this percentage was actually higher in the late nineteenth century, during the heyday of trans-Atlantic migration between Europe and America. For instance, the approximately 48 million Europeans that left the continent between 1846 and 1924 represented about 12 per cent of the European population in 1900. In the same period, about 17 million people left the British Isles, equal to 41 per cent of Britain's population in 1900 (Massey 1988: 381).

Although international migration has thus not increased in relative terms, falling costs of travel and infrastructure improvements have increased non-migratory forms of mobility such as tourism, business trips and commuting. Another important change has been increasing of long-distance migration between world-regions and the growing





Figure 1.1 International migrants and refugees, as a percentage of world population, 1960–2017

Sources: Authors' calculations based on the *Global Bilateral Migration Database* (World Bank) (1960–1980 data) and UNPD (2017) (1990–2017 data)

share of non-Europeans in global migrant populations. These trends have increased the diversity of immigrant populations in terms of *ethnicity*, culture, religion, language and education.

The vast majority of people remain in their countries of birth. Only 3 per cent of the world population are international migrants, so 97 per cent stay at home. Yet many more people move within countries. Internal migration (often in the form of rural–urban movement) is far higher than international migration, especially in large and populous countries like China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria. It is impossible to know exact numbers of internal migrants, but they are likely to represent at least 80 per cent of all migrants in the world (UNDP 2009). The number of internal migrants in China alone has been estimated at levels of 250 million (Li and Wang 2015), which roughly equal the worldwide number of international migrants. Although this book focuses on international migration, internal and international mobility are closely interlinked and driven by the same development processes, and the book will therefore refer to internal migration where relevant.

In addition, the impact of international migration is considerably larger than such percentages suggest, particularly in origin communities and in destination cities where migrants tend to concentrate. The departure of migrants has considerable consequences for origin communities. Money sent home by migrants allows families to significantly improve living standards, keep children at school and to invest in local businesses. Under unfavourable circumstances, however, the departure of people can also further undermine prospects for growth and change in remittance-dependent and migration-obsessed communities. In destination countries, migrants concentrate in certain urban areas, or in areas of intensive horticulture, where the social, economic and cultural impacts of migration can be life-changing, either positively or negatively. Migration thus affects not only the migrants themselves but also origin and destination societies as a whole. There can be few people in either industrial or developing countries today who do not have a personal experience of migration or its effects (Map 1.1).



Map 1.1 International migratory movements from 1973

Note: The size of the arrowheads gives an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable

The growth and diversity of international migration

Reflecting broader patterns of globalization and labour market dynamics, international migrants have increasingly concentrated in particular regions and a relatively limited set of prime destination countries (see Czaika and de Haas 2014). Map 1.1 gives a very rough idea of the major migratory flows since 1973. Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of migrant populations in major world regions between 1960 and 2017. The data shows that migrant numbers in the industrial regions of Western Europe, North America and the Middle East have been growing fast. Immigrant populations been growing at a much slower pace in Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Latin America.

Figure 1.3 examines migrant populations as a share of the total population of different world regions. The relative magnitude of immigration is highest in North America and the Middle East, where in 2017 immigrants represent 15.3 per cent of the total population, and Western Europe, where this share is 12.7 per cent. By contrast, immigrants have represented a *declining* share of populations in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America.

Table 1.1 displays the 25 most important countries of origin and destination in the world. With an estimated 44.5 million immigrants in 2017, the US is by far the most important migration destination in the world. Saudi Arabia, Germany and Russia come next with immigrant populations of around 12 million. Other important destinations are the UK, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, Canada and Australia. Many developing countries, including South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Thailand, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran are home to significant immigrant populations. Measured as share of their population, Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, as well as 'global city states' such as Singapore and Hong Kong have the highest immigration levels.

India, Mexico and Russia are the most important origin countries of migrants, followed by China, Bangladesh, Syria, Pakistan, Ukraine, the Philippines and the UK. In relative terms, the world's most prominent sources of migrant labour, such as Mexico, the Philippines, Morocco and Poland, have between 5 and 12 per cent of their population living abroad. Such percentages can be much higher in small countries, island states in countries affected by warfare, such as Somalia, Syria and amongst Palestinians.




Figure 1.2 International immigrants by region, 1960–2017

Source: Calculations based on Global Bilateral Migration Database and United Nations Population Division




Figure 1.3 International immigrants as a share of the population by region, 1960–2017

Source: Calculations based on Global Bilateral Migration Database and United Nations Population Division

The data also shows that prominent immigration countries such as Russia, United Kingdom and Germany often have high numbers of their own citizens living abroad. This exemplifies that globalization and economic development often go along with high levels of immigration *and* emigration. It is difficult to crunch countries into categories of ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ countries: many countries are both. And most people move *within* regions. These facts expose the flawed nature of popular views that represent contemporary global migration as a massive move or ‘exodus’ (Collier 2013) from the global ‘South’ to the global ‘North’.

Some of those who move are *forced migrants*: people compelled to flee their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. The reasons for flight include political or ethnic violence or persecution, development projects like large dams, wildlife conservation projects, or natural disasters like floods, hurricanes or earthquakes. Although the vast majority of forced migrants move over short distances, some cross borders. There is no evidence of a long-term increase in refugee numbers, as levels rather go up and down depending on the outbreak and end of wars. The number of registered international refugees decreased from 17.8 million to 8.7 million between 1992 and 2005, mainly because of a decline in the number of conflicts. After 2005, the number rebounded to 17.2 million in 2016, primarily as a result of war in Syria, but it may also reflect the statistical inclusion of refugees, particularly in Africa, who were previously not accounted for.

Most forced migrants remain in the poorest areas of the world, either within their countries or in neighbouring countries. Many refugees prefer to stay close to home, and of those wishing to move farther, only a minority of refugees have the resources to achieve this goal. In fact, the biggest victims of war, oppression and environmental disaster are those who cannot flee and become trapped in life-endangering situations. Since 1990, refugees have counted for between 7 and 10 per cent of the global migrant population (Fransen and de Haas 2019; Hatton 2009) (see also Figure 1.1). In 2017 refugees represented about 10 per cent of the global migrant population, thus about 0.3 per cent of the total world population. These shares vary greatly across regions. The highest percentages can be found in the Africa and the Middle East, where about one quarter of international migrants are refugees. These percentages are lower and generally declining in most other world regions.

Table 1.1 Major immigration and emigration countries, 2017

Destination country	Immigrants	Share of population (%)	Origin country	Emigrants	Share of population (%)
US	44,525,900	13.7	India	16,588,000	1.2
Saudi Arabia	12,185,000	37.0	Mexico	12,965,000	10.0
Germany	12,165,000	14.8	Russian Fed.	10,636,000	7.4
Russia	11,652,000	8.1	China	9,962,000	0.7
UK	8,842,000	13.4	Bangladesh	7,500,000	4.6
United Arab Em.	8,313,000	88.4	Syria	6,864,000	37.6
France	7,903,000	12.2	Pakistan	5,979,000	3.0
Canada	7,861,000	21.5	Ukraine	5,942,000	13.4
Australia	7,036,000	28.8	Philippines	5,681,000	5.4
Spain	5,947,000	12.8	UK	4,921,000	7.4
Italy	5,907,000	10.0	Afghanistan	4,826,000	13.6
India	5,189,000	0.4	Poland	4,701,000	12.3
Ukraine	4,964,000	11.2	Indonesia	4,234,000	1.6
Turkey	4,882,000	6.0	Germany	4,208,000	5.1
South Africa	4,037,000	7.1	Kazakhstan	4,074,000	22.4
Kazakhstan	3,635,000	20.0	Palestine	3,804,000	77.3
Thailand	3,589,000	5.2	Romania	3,579,000	18.2
Pakistan	3,398,000	1.7	Turkey	3,419,000	4.2
Jordan	3,234,000	33.3	Egypt	3,413,000	3.5
Kuwait	3,123,000	75.5	Italy	3,029,000	5.1
Hong Kong	2,883,000	39.1	US	3,017,000	0.9
Malaysia	2,704,000	8.5	Morocco	2,899,000	8.1
Iran	2,699,000	3.3	Myanmar	2,895,000	5.4
Singapore	2,623,000	46.0	Colombia	2,736,000	5.6
Switzerland	2,506,000	29.6	Viet Nam	2,727,000	2.9
Japan	2,321,000	1.8	Rep. of Korea	2,478,000	4.9
Côte d'Ivoire	2,197,000	9.0	Portugal	2,267,000	21.9
Argentina	2,165,000	4.9	France	2,207,000	3.4
Oman	2,073,000	44.7	Uzbekistan	1,992,000	6.2
Netherlands	2,057,000	12.1	Somalia	1,988,000	13.5

Source: United Nations Population Division, 2017 estimates, including refugees

The number of 'refugee-producing' countries has shown a declining trend and refugees represent a relatively small share of all migrants. The idea of a global 'refugee crisis' has no basis in fact, at least not from a Western perspective. About 85 per cent of all refugees live in developing countries (UNHCR 2017). Countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon,



Source: Getty Images/NurPhoto

Photo 1.1 Syrian refugees in Istanbul, Turkey, in August 2016

Iran, Ethiopia and Jordan currently host the largest refugee populations. In 2018, Turkey hosted more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees, equivalent to about 4.4 per cent of its 82 million population. In the same year, almost 1 million Syrian refugees lived in Lebanon, on a total population of 6 million. Western societies, by contrast, receive a comparatively low number of refugees, and current numbers are anything but unprecedented.

Trends and patterns of global migration

Throughout the world, long-standing migratory patterns are persisting in new forms, while new movements are developing in response to economic, political and cultural change, and violent conflicts. Since the end of the Second World War, the main trends and patterns of migration have been:

1. The *globalization of migration*: This is the tendency for more and more countries to be significantly affected by international migration. Immigration countries tend to receive migrants from an increasingly diverse array of origin countries, so that most immigration countries have entrants from a broad spectrum of economic, social and cultural backgrounds. A growing number of lower income countries have been entering the global migration stage, along with processes of social transformation and economic development that have motivated and enabled a growing number of people to migrate. While the share of international migrants as a percentage of the world population has remained rather constant, there has been a strong growth in inter-continental migration. Long-distance migration between major world regions has increased fast. While in 1960 movements between continents migration represented 38 per cent of global migration, this share had risen to 55 per cent in 2017. As part of

this process, migrants from an increasingly diverse pool of origin countries have been concentrating in a relatively small pool of prime destination countries where economic power and employment opportunities are concentrated (see Czaika and de Haas 2014). Some researchers have claimed that this has led to unprecedented patterns of 'superdiversity' in destination cities (see Vertovec 2007).

2. *The changing direction of dominant migration flows:* Since their 'discovery' of the Americas, Europeans have been moving outward to conquer, colonize and settle in foreign lands. As a result of decolonization, rapid economic growth and demographic changes, these patterns were reversed after World War II. Europe transformed from a continent of colonizers and emigrants to a destination region for an increasingly diverse array of origin countries. As part of this 'global migration reversal', Europeans represent a declining share of immigrants in classical immigration countries such as the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In 1960 more than three quarters of all international migrants who moved to another world region were Europeans. This proportion had shrunk to 22 per cent by 2017. By contrast, the share of Latin Americans, and in particular Asians, in long-distance, inter-regional migration has increased.
3. *The emergence of new migration destinations:* Particularly since the 1973 Oil Shock, the oil-rich Gulf region emerged as a global magnet for migrant workers from Asia and also Africa, hosting about 28 million workers in 2017. In absolute numbers, the Gulf is now the third most important migration destination after North America and Western Europe. In addition, new migration destinations also emerged in the industrial cores of East Asia (Japan, South Korea) while industrializing countries in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore) have attracted increasing numbers of mainly regional migrants from countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar and Bangladesh.
4. *The proliferation of migration transitions:* This occurs when traditional lands of emigration become lands of immigration. Growing transit migration is often the prelude to becoming predominantly immigration countries. States as diverse as Poland, Spain, Morocco, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Turkey and South Korea have been experiencing various stages and forms of a migration transition. But many other countries, for example in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, have experienced *reverse migration transitions* as they transformed from immigration to emigration countries and the diversity of their population decreases rather than increases.
5. *The feminization of labour migration:* In the past many labour migrations were male-dominated, and women were often dealt with under the category of family reunion, even if they did take up employment. Although the share of female migrants as a share of total migration has remained stable at levels of around 46 per cent for decades (de Haas *et al.* 2019a), the feminization of migration primarily pertains to the increasing participation of women in labour migration. Today women workers form the majority in movements as diverse as those of Cape Verdeans to Italy, Ecuadorians to Spain, Ethiopians to the Middle East, Thai to Japan, Myanmar to Thailand, Indonesians to Malaysia, and Filipinas to the Middle East and Europe. However, because of the high presence of female migrant workers in largely *informal sectors* such as personal care and cleaning, women are often still a less visible part of the workforce compared to men.
6. *The politicization and securitization of migration:* Domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policies of *states* around the world are increasingly affected by international migration. Communities of migrants and their



Source: Kerilyn Schewel

Photo 1.2 A return migrant's store, paid with money she earned in Saudi Arabia. Ziway, Ethiopia, 2018

descendants are demanding a place in destination societies, frequently sparking tensions and intense debate on *citizenship*, diversity and identity. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, this has also gone along with the securitization of migration, which is the tendency by some politicians and media to portray migration as a fundamental threat to the security and cultural integrity of destination societies. On the other hand, as part of a 'global race for talent', governments around the world have tried to facilitate the immigration of skilled workers, investors and students. The arrival of asylum seekers typically sparks debates amongst humanitarian and religious groups advocating their need for protections, and groups who may see their large-scale arrival as a threat to native workers, security and the welfare state.

The challenges of international migration

Migration has gained increasing political salience over the past decades. That is why we have called this book *The Age of Migration*. While movements of people across borders have shaped societies since time immemorial, what is distinctive in recent decades is thus their centrality to (1) domestic and (2) international politics. This does not imply that migration is something new – indeed, human beings have always moved in search of new opportunities or to escape conflict and oppression. However, migration took on a new, more global, character with the beginnings of European expansion from the sixteenth century and, particularly, the Industrial Revolution from the nineteenth century, which set in motion a massive transfer of population from rural to urban areas both within and across borders.

Since the 1950s Europe has transformed from a source of colonizers and settlers to a global destination region for migrants from an increasingly diverse array of non-Western origin countries. Decreasing migration out of Europe went along with an increasing share of Asians, Latin Americans and, to a lesser extent, Africans in global migrant populations. This would have fundamental repercussions for migration to traditional countries of European settlement in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand. The increasing share of non-European, non-white and often non-Christian migrants in fast-growing immigrant populations in Europe and North America has sparked significant unease and fierce political debate between liberals welcoming increasing diversity, and conservative voices claiming that ‘too much’ diversity forms a threat to the cultural integrity and social cohesion of destination societies. Likewise, migration has also become a politically contentious issue in new migrant destinations in the Gulf, Africa and Asia.

While global migration rates have not increased, more migrants move over large distances. Furthermore communication and travel have become easier as a result of new transport and communication technologies. This has enabled migrants to remain in almost constant touch with families and friends back home and to travel back and forth more often, and to maintain multiple and transnational identities, which can challenge traditional ideas of national identity. International migration has thus become a central dynamic within globalization. While people have always moved, an increasing number of low- and middle-income countries have become integrated in global migration systems centred around old destinations in North America and Russia and more recent destinations in Western Europe, the Gulf and East Asia. This globalization of migration has confronted societies with unprecedented levels of diversity.

Immigration poses two major challenges for domestic and international politics. First, the arrival and settlement of migrants and the resulting increase in diversity have challenged dominant concepts of nation states and have sparked intense debate about identity, belonging and integration. The second defining feature of the age of migration is the challenge that migration poses to the sovereignty of states, specifically to their ability to regulate movements of people across their borders in a globalizing world. The central tension is the following: while more effective regulation of migration would benefit from improved international cooperation, governments are often unwilling to give up national sovereignty on vital issues around migration and citizenship.

International migration in global governance

States have always struggled to control migration, but these challenges seem particularly significant in an era where broad trends of globalization and economic deregulation seem to run counter to the wish to regulate the arrival and stay of foreigners. While most governments have abolished the exit controls of the past, efforts to regulate *immigration* are at an all-time high and involve intensive bilateral, regional and international diplomacy. Although the majority of migrants move within the law, a significant share of migrants cross borders in irregular ways. Paradoxically, irregular migration is often a *consequence* of tighter control measures, which have blocked earlier forms of spontaneous and more circular mobility.

The experiences with large-scale migration such as from Mexico to the US and Turkey and Morocco to the EU have shown that ill-conceived migration restrictions can be counterproductive by interrupting circulation, encouraging permanent settlement and

encouraging undocumented migration (de Haas *et al.* 2019; Massey and Pren 2012). This exposes the significant challenge that the effective regulation of migration represents for governments. Policy trends seem contradictory: on the one hand, politicians cling to national sovereignty, with such slogans as ‘British jobs for British workers’. On the other hand, politicians are sensitive to businesses lobbying to let more migrant workers in or to turn a blind eye to illegal employment practices, and often have limited legal and practical tools to curb immigration of family members and refugees.

The complexity and fragmentation of power require governments to cooperate with other organizations and institutions, both public and private, foreign and domestic. An important manifestation of global governance is the expansion of consultative processes within regional unions such as the EU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the South-American Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur). The implementation of free travel protocols in such unions has boosted intra-regional mobility and commerce, although the adoption and implementation of the right of establishment (including work) and residency has not been achieved except for the EU, where it also remains an important point of political contention.

Between 1945 and the 1980s, many governments in Western Europe and North America did not see international migration as a central political issue. In developing countries, the picture was more mixed. For labour-exporting countries such as the Philippines, Egypt and Morocco, organized emigration was seen as a key political ‘safety valve’ to alleviate discontent, decrease poverty and to generate remittances. In most developing countries, however, governments were often more concerned about internal migration from rural areas to large cities.

This situation began to change in the late 1980s, when migration governance started to become an increasingly prominent topic in international fora. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – which regroups the wealthiest democracies in the world – convened its first international conference on international migration in 1986 (OECD 1987). This was partly related to processes of regional economic integration, which also had a migration component. As most European Community (EC, the predecessor of the EU) countries started to remove their internal boundaries with the signature of the *Schengen* Agreement in 1985 and its full implementation in 1995, they became increasingly concerned about the joint control of external borders as well as the alignment of visa and immigration policies.

The adoption of the 1990 Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families by the UN General Assembly brought into sharp relief global tensions and differences surrounding international migration. It did not come into force until 2003, and major immigration countries refused to sign the convention. By October 2018 it had been ratified by just 54 of the UN’s 193 states, virtually all of them countries of emigration. Many emigration countries, including India, China, Brazil and Ethiopia have not signed the Convention.

The opposed interests between major origin and destination countries have been a central obstacle standing in the way of achieving improved international migration governance. Destination countries are generally unwilling to concede national sovereignty that would force them to adopt more liberal immigration regimes. Governments of origin countries have often limited success, or interest in, defending the rights of migrant workers. This can be partly because they have a weak negotiation positions vis-à-vis more powerful destination countries, because they fear migrants’ political activism from abroad, or

simply because ruling elites are not very much concerned about the significant exploitation, extortion and abuse by state agents and employers that migrant workers often have to endure.

Globalization has coincided with the strengthening of global institutions: the World Trade Organization (WTO) for trade, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for finance, the World Bank for economic development, and so on. But the will to cooperate has not been as strong in the migration field. There are international bodies with specific tasks – such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for refugees, the International Labour Office (ILO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) – but no institution has the responsibility, capacity and authority to bring about significant change.

The UN General Assembly held its first High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006. The Secretary General's report on this meeting recommended a forum for UN member states to discuss migration and development issues. The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GMFD) has met annually since, although its role has been purely advisory, and it is hard to see any concrete results of these meetings. In 2016 the General Assembly of the UN decided to develop a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), which was adopted in 2018 in Marrakech, Morocco. Although the Global Compact is non-legally binding, several countries, including the US and Hungary, pulled out of the GCM before it was even adopted. Despite the lip service paid to lofty goals of improved global migration governance, the key obstacle for achieving a higher degree of effective international collaboration on migration remains that governments are generally reluctant to surrender national sovereignty on migration controls to supra-national bodies.

Aims and argument of the book

The Age of Migration sets out to provide an understanding of the contemporary global dynamics of migration and of the consequences for societies, migrants and non-migrants everywhere. It provides an interdisciplinary introduction to the subject of international migration and the emergence of increasingly diverse societies. This will help readers to put more detailed accounts of specific *migratory processes* in context. The book argues that international migration is a central dynamic in globalization and is recasting states and societies in distinctive and powerful ways.

Building upon the latest insights from research and cutting-edge data, this book offers information on

- Long- and short-term trends and patterns of global migration;
- Theories on the causes and continuation of migration;
- Impacts of migration on destination and origin societies;
- Migration experiences and migrant identities;
- The implications of migration for states and politics;
- The evolution and effectiveness of migration policies.

This book provides a synthesis of theoretical and empirical insights from all disciplines studying migration – ranging from anthropology and history to sociology, geography, political science and economics. *The Age of Migration* aims to present these insights in

ways that are accessible to readers from diverse academic or professional backgrounds, and will accentuate the contribution of research from all disciplines to our common understanding of migration. This is based on a conviction that different disciplines and theories provide different views on migration, which are often complementary and help us to develop a richer and more critical view by helping to look at the same issues from different angles. We therefore hope that the evidence presented in the book provides much-needed nuance in a polarized debate in which, all too often, ‘pro-’ and ‘anti-’ migration voices exaggerate the downsides and upsides of migration.

We can summarize the main arguments of this book as follows:

- Migration is an intrinsic – and therefore inevitable – part of broader processes of global change and development;
- Labour demand in destination societies is the main driver of international migration;
- While states play a key role in initiating migration, once set in motion, migration processes tend to gain their own momentum;
- Migration is a partly autonomous process that will almost inevitably go along with some degree of permanent settlement;
- Migration is neither the cause of, nor a panacea for, structural socioeconomic problems in destination and origin societies;
- While governments have a legitimate desire to control migration, ill-considered migration policies often have counterproductive effects.

Our first objective is to describe and explain contemporary international migration. The second objective is to explain how migrant settlement is bringing about increased ethnic diversity and how it affects broader social, cultural and political change in destination *and* origin societies. Understanding these changes is the precondition for effective political action to deal with problems, tensions *and* opportunities linked to migration and ethnic diversity. The third objective is to link the two analyses, by examining the complex interactions between migration and broader processes of change in origin and destination societies. There are large bodies of empirical and theoretical work on both themes. However, the two are often inadequately linked. The linkages can best be understood by analysing the migratory process in its totality.

Structure of the book

The Age of Migration is structured as follows. A first group of chapters (2–5) provide the theoretical and historical background necessary to understand contemporary global trends. Chapter 2 examines the main categories and typologies that researchers, the media and politicians use to describe and analyse migration. It will provide definitions and familiarize readers with important terms that will appear throughout the text, and it will highlight the dangers of uncritically adopting categories and discourses of migration that provide distorted and biased views of migration.

Chapter 3 will discuss theories and concepts that are useful to explain the causes and continuation of migration. It will show the need to understand migration as an intrinsic part of broader processes of development and social transformation. It will argue that a combination of insights from various theories contribute to obtain a richer, more

profound, understanding of migration processes. For instance, the analysis of theories will help to understand the paradox that development in poor countries often leads to more, *instead of less*, migration and why middle-income countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Morocco and the Philippines tend to have the highest emigration levels. Labour market theories will help us to understand why low-skilled migration continues even in times of high domestic unemployment. Other theories will show the need to analyse migration as a partly autonomous social process – because, once started, migration tends to gain its own momentum through the formation of *migrant networks* and other feedback processes. This helps to explain why migration often continues despite governments' attempts to stop more people from coming in, and why perhaps well-intended, but ill-considered policies can become counterproductive.

Chapter 4 focuses on the social and political issues in destination countries arising from ethnic and cultural diversity resulting from the arrival of migrants. The chapter will argue how immigration often results in the establishment of (semi-) permanent migrant communities, despite frequent attempts of governments to prevent this. The chapter will discuss the various modes of migrant incorporation or integration, ranging from assimilation to systematic racism, segregation and minority formation, or between forms of multiculturalism. It will show how experiences of incorporation are dependent on factors such as class, gender and state ideologies.

Chapter 5 describes the history of international migration from early modern times until 1945. This chapter illustrates the necessity of adopting a long-term view in order to achieve a fundamental understanding of contemporary migration processes, to understand what is new, and what is rather a continuation of previous trends and patterns. The chapter will particularly raise awareness about the key roles that states have played in shaping contemporary world migration such as through warfare, colonization, slavery and recruitment of workers. Such patterns are often reproduced until the present day because of the cultural, commercial and social links created by colonial and imperial interventions.

A second group of chapters (6–9) provide a more detailed analysis of migration trends in the different world regions since 1945. Chapter 6 will focus on migration in Europe, including migration trends in the former Soviet Union and its successor countries. Chapter 7 analyses migration trends in North, Middle and South America and the Caribbean. Chapter 8 focuses on migration in the Asia-Pacific region, and Chapter 9 will analyse migration trends in Africa and the Middle East. Because of the limited space, these chapters are inevitably broad-brush. The aim is not to be exhaustive, but to analyse how general trends in the global political economy are manifested in different migratory outcomes in various regions and countries. This is based on the conviction that, notwithstanding the complexity and diversity of migration, contemporary migration is shaped by similar forces of political and economic transformation affecting societies and people around the world.

To reflect this argument, and to facilitate comparison, the regional chapters will apply a similar periodization. Four periods will be distinguished, signifying main shifts in the international political economy:

- The period between 1945 and 1973 was characterized by strong economic growth, decolonization and conflict related to the *Cold War*. It is also known as the second era of globalization of trade and finance. Different from the first era of globalization between 1870 and 1914, this period was characterized by high government intervention in economic systems and labour markets as well as strong controls of

capital flows. In Western countries migration regimes were liberalized, coinciding with high levels of post-colonial and (predominantly Mediterranean) labour migration to Western Europe, increasing migration from Mexico and the Caribbean to North America as well as conflict-related migrations in Africa and Asia partly linked to the Cold War and post-colonial state formation. While some developing countries embarked upon 'labour export' policies, others attempted to prevent a brain drain. Authoritarianism and economic stagnation led to the demise of South America as a global migration destination;

- The 1973 Oil Shock marked a period of global economic restructuring and the emergence of a new international division of labour, which would last until 1989. The economic boom following the Oil Shock heralded the rise of the Gulf region as a major destination for migrant workers from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Economic stagnation, austerity and relocation of industrial production to low-wage countries, particularly in Asia, temporarily decreased demand for lower-skilled workers in Western countries, although migration continued partly through family migration. Rapid economic growth in East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Malaysia started to attract migrants from poorer Asian countries, while Asian migration to the Gulf and North America increased fast;
- The fall of the Berlin Wall 1989 and the subsequent collapse of Communist regimes marked the start of the third era of 'neoliberal' globalization. The end of the Cold War heralded a period of market triumphalism, economic deregulation and accelerated globalization of trade and finance. While the political turmoil around the Cold War and the concomitant disintegration of the former Soviet Union and destabilization of 'strong states' in Africa and Asia led to a temporary spike in refugee migration, the removal of exit restrictions boosted East-West labour migration and circulation from and between former Communist countries. A combination of economic growth, demographic ageing and labour market deregulation increased the demand for lower- and high-skilled migrant labour in North America, Europe and East Asia, while the Gulf consolidated its position as a prime migration destination for migrant workers from South and Southeast Asia;
- Since 2008, the Great Recession heralded a period of economic uncertainty, fiscal crises and political polarization, particularly in Europe and North America, accentuating the rise of new economic powers in Asia and elsewhere. Intensified global competition for skilled workers and fee-paying students coincided with a diffusion of point-systems to make immigration serve economic needs, fuelling migration from an increasingly diverse array of origin countries. Fast-growing East and Southeast Asian and Gulf economies consolidated their position as global migration destinations while countries like Turkey, Russia, South Africa and Brazil strengthened their position as regional migration destinations. Popular discontent with the consequences of neoliberal globalization and growing inequality was mobilized by populist leaders stoking up xenophobia. This contributed to the Brexit vote and election of Trump in 2016 but also to growing opposition against free trade and calls for more taxation of the rich and increased controls on capital flows (see Piketty 2014).

Each of the chapters will evaluate the repercussions of these global shifts for different world regions. While the regions differ significantly, the analyses will also stress instances where patterns are repeated, and reveal the extent to which the challenges posed by

migration to the sovereignty of states are often rather similar across various historical and regional contexts.

A third group of chapters (10–14) elaborate on a number of key themes and challenges represented by migration. Chapter 10 shows how migration has been central to processes of modern state formation while simultaneously being a challenge for national identity and state sovereignty. It explains the complex fields of national and international politics out of which immigration and emigration policies arise. It will also discuss attempts to achieve improved international governance of migration as well as refugee movements.

Chapter 11 analyses how migration policies have evolved over the post-1945 era, and analyses their effectiveness. It will give an overview of the migration policy toolbox: the various instruments governments use to control the arrival, integration and return of migrants. The chapter challenges the idea that migration policies have become more restrictive despite rhetoric suggesting the contrary, and shows how modern migration policies have increasingly been about selection rather than numbers. The chapter will discuss the effectiveness of migration policies, the unintended effects of migration restrictions, and the significant trade-off and dilemmas this creates for policy makers and societies.

Chapter 12 considers the labour market position of migrant workers and the meaning of migration for the economies of destination countries. The analysis illustrates the large extent to which migration is driven by the intrinsic and therefore largely inevitable demand for migrant labour in industrial and post-industrial societies. The analysis shows that migrants have become a structural feature of the lower- and higher-skilled workforce in high- and middle-income countries around the world. It highlights the continued relevance of recruitment as a driving and facilitating force for international migration. The chapter also discusses the key role of migration in labour market restructuring and the emergence of neoliberal economies based on employment practices such as sub-contracting, temporary employment and informal-sector work.

Chapter 13 examines the social position of immigrants in destination societies, looking at such factors as legal status, social policy, formation of ethnic communities, racism, citizenship and national identity. It will address crucial questions around immigrant integration and the factors explaining why some migrations lead to the formation of ethnic minorities suffering from various forms of isolation, racism and marginalization, and why many other migrants achieve high levels of socio-economic mobility, often (but not always) combined with rapid cultural assimilation and high levels of intermarriage.

Chapter 14 discusses how emigration affects processes of development and social transformation in origin countries. In particular, this chapter will examine the debate on the development impacts of migration, such as between those arguing that migration leads to a *brain drain* versus those arguing that migration can be a *brain gain* through remittances and the knowledge that migrants send back. It will examine the factors and conditions that explain why the development impact of migration seems more negative in some cases, and more positive in others. The chapter will show that although it is unlikely to solve more structural development problems, migration has considerable benefits for migrants and their families that provide a strong motivating force for people to migrate.

Chapter 15 sums up the arguments of the book, reviews current trends in global migration and speculates on the future of global migration. It discusses the dilemmas faced by governments and people in attempting to find appropriate responses to the challenges of an increasingly mobile world, and point to some of the major obstacles blocking the way to better international cooperation on migration issues.

Guide to Further Reading

There are too many books on international migration to list here. Many important works are referred to in the guide to further reading sections found at the end of each chapter. A wide range of relevant literature is listed in the Bibliography. *Migration and Development* (1997) by Ronald Skeldon is an excellent introduction for readers aiming to develop an understanding of migration as part of broader development processes. *Worlds in Motion* (1998) by Douglas Massey and his colleagues gives a comprehensive overview of migration theories and migration trends around the world. Major books that focus on particular regions will be mentioned in other chapters.

Important information on all aspects of international migration is provided by several specialized journals. *International Migration Review* (New York: Center for Migration Studies) was established in 1964 and provides excellent comparative information. *International Migration* (IOM, Geneva) is also a valuable comparative source. *Population and Development Review* is a prominent journal on population studies with many contributions on migration, while *Demography* is a prominent interdisciplinary journal publishing predominantly quantitative analyses of migration. Some journals, which formerly concentrated on Europe, are becoming more global in focus. These include the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, the *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, *Race and Class* and *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. A journal concerned with transnational issues is *Global Networks*. Recently many new migration journals have appeared, including *Migration Studies and Comparative Migration Studies*.

Several international organizations provide comparative information on migrations. The most useful is the OECD's annual *International Migration Outlook*. The IOM has published its *World Migration Report* annually since 2000.

Several internet sites are concerned with issues of migration and ethnic diversity. A few of the most significant ones are listed here. Since they are in turn linked with many other websites, this list should provide a starting point for further exploration:

African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS), University of the Witwatersrand:
www.wits.ac.za/acms

Center for Migration Studies, New York: www.cmsny.org

Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana: www.cms.ug.edu.gh

Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford:
www.compas.ox.ac.uk

Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) Programme:
www.gulfmigration.org

International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Vienna:
www.icmpd.org

International Migration Institute (IMI), University of Amsterdam:
www.migrationinstitute.org

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion (IMISCOE):
www.imiscoe.org



International Network on Migration and Development, Autonomous University of Zacatecas: www.migracionydesarrollo.org
International Organization for Migration (IOM): www.iom.int
Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington DC: www.migrationpolicy.org
Migration Matters: www.migrationmatters.me
Migration Observatory, University of Oxford: www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk
Migration Policy Centre (MPC), European University Institute, Florence: www.migrationpolicycentre.eu
Migration Research Center at Koç University (MiReKoc), Istanbul: www.mirekoc.ku.edu.tr
Refugee Studies Centre (RSC), University of Oxford: www.rsc.ox.ac.uk
Sussex Centre for Migration Research: www.sussex.ac.uk/migration
The Hugo Observatory on Environment, Migration, Politics: www.labos.ulg.ac.be/hugo
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): www.unhcr.org
United Nations Population Division: www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration

Extra resources can be found at: www.age-of-migration.com