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Part I

INTRODUCTION

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Globalization and Its Outcomes

An Introduction

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Globalization is profoundly affecting the lives of people around the world. It is a set of processes in which capital, technology, people, goods, and information move relentlessly across the inherited map of political boundaries (Dicken, 1998; Feenstra, 1998; Mittelman, 2000), and through which the interdependence of societies over vast distances and ever-shortening time frames has been intensified. This compression of time and space across a broad range of human activities has been made possible by the dramatic decline in the costs of transportation, communication, and production, and by changes in the formal rules that once established substantial (though never entirely impermeable) barriers against flows across borders (Harvey, 1989).

Our objective in this volume is to report research that examines globalization processes and how they are affecting people and the societies in which they live. We have organized the discussion of this complex set of topics in three parts. In Part I, we present globalization as a set of economic flows, as a complex of information and knowledge linkages, and as a network of migration between countries and regions. In turn, these flows affect countries and communities in differential ways; they

are mediated by the actions of governments and by the level of incorporation of the communities and countries into a globalized world. While globalization has a myriad of impacts across the social, political, and cultural spectrum, we concentrate in this book on societal outcomes in the areas of health, welfare, and citizenship (i.e., how communities are reconstituting themselves as supporting or opposing new identities that have evolved out of the encounter of social groups with a globalized world). Thus we do not pretend to present a complete portrait of the processes of globalization and their diverse outcomes; such an evaluation is now beyond the scope of any one book, given the explosion of research on the subject over the past decades and the contrasting evaluations of it. Lively debates exist about the nature of the individual community experiences and about the benefits and costs of globalization; these debates are represented in the range of arguments in this book. If there is one point on which researchers of different ideological and methodological preferences can agree, it is that experiences are widely disparate across the globe.

We recognize that some of the cross-border flows that comprise globalization are not unprecedented—many have been occurring for a very long time, as argued by Immanuel Wallerstein and his world system acolytes—but we believe that their scale and their simultaneous occurrence make contemporary globalization something new and worth detailed examination. (For a skeptical view of globalization as a recent development, see Wallerstein, 2000, and Keohane & Nye, 2000.) We also recognize that globalization is neither an inevitable nor an irreversible set of processes. By this statement, we mean that the present character of globalization is not the inevitable product of scientific and technological change, or of the inexorable laws of the economy, but instead is an outcome of decisions made by individuals, groups, firms, nation-states, and transnational organizations. Moreover, globalization can be slowed, deflected, or—as some have argued—stopped in its tracks since September 11, 2001 (see Steinmetz, 2003).

Earlier trends toward global openness and diminution of trade controls at the beginning of the 20th century were soon reversed during the global slowdown of the 1920s and 1930s. Many governments reintroduced tariffs and quotas in an attempt to protect their domestic manufacturers and farmers. Recent tensions within the World Trade Organization (WTO) between the European Union and the United States over steel, bananas, genetically modified food, aircraft manufacturing subsidies, and agricultural price supports testify to the ongoing uncertainties about trade relations between the two biggest economies. Terror (real and imagined) and the war against it have constrained the pace of globalization and increased doubts among many about its efficacy, especially

in the movement of people. For example, fear of terror and the numerous controls that a wide range of countries have placed on the cross-border flows of people and products to counter real or imagined terrorist threats may constrain growing globalization. The recent breakdown of the Cancun WTO trade talks on agricultural subsidies (in this case, due to the claims made by poor countries for an end to the substantial subsidies made to rich countries' farmers) is another reminder that the process of globalization is subject to challenges, setbacks, and missteps.

As editors, we want to emphasize that we are "agnostic" in a scientific sense about the outcomes of globalization. We do not simply assume, as many do, that globalization is beneficial and something to be encouraged. Nor do we simply assume, as many do, that globalization is destructive and unjust, and something to be opposed and defeated. Rather, our commitment is to the systematic examination of globalization and its impacts on people and societies, a view that is reflected in the diverse set of chapters in this volume. Individual authors clearly have their preferences, variably expressed in their chapters, and a sense of the contrasting perspectives can be gained by a comparative reading.

PROCESSES OF GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is uneven and incomplete because the pace of globalization varies over time, and not all societies are fully integrated into the global system (Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Wade, 1990; Wallerstein, 2000). Nonetheless, it remains the case that the integration of nations and societies into the global system is advancing, with increasing numbers of them subject to global flows across their boundaries year after year; states and societies are becoming more tightly integrated and interdependent as time passes (Castells, 1996; Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; Harvey, 1989; Mittelman, 2000; Strange, 1996). But it is not necessarily clear what sense we should make of these flows and whether they really constitute a challenge to our understandings of the world. James H. Mittelman raises precisely this question in Chapter 2; he asks whether globalization is a new paradigm for the field of international studies, predicated as it is on the notion of the globe as a collective of autonomous states, now numbering about 190. As globalization's economic processes continue apace and transnational corporations continue to push their operations wider into more world regions and deeper into existing communities, the issue of the "hollowing out of states" by these corporations remains a potent one (Giddens, 2000; Taylor, 1994). In the extremist perspective of Ohmae (1995), states are unable to control their own borders and seem doomed to shrink as economic partners, but cau-

tion is warranted since many commentators (e.g., Johnston, 1993) have pointed out that state functions continue to aggregate and state spending (as a proportion of gross domestic product [GDP]) is still generally growing. Mittelman concludes that globalization is a “protoparadigm” that shows every indication of undermining the assumptions of the field of international studies that has existed for about 100 years. In any case, the dialectic of states and transnational corporations is likely to evolve in an unpredictable manner, sometimes favoring one and sometimes the other.

As Mittelman argues in his chapter, globalization is a complex phenomenon that raises questions about the ability of existing frameworks to analyze, and thus it is important to clarify the kinds of processes that we are addressing. The first aspect of globalization concerns economic flows, the increasing movement across national borders of traded goods (both intermediate and final products), foreign direct investment (corporate investments in production and distribution facilities abroad), foreign portfolio investment, and financial instruments (including currencies, credit, and insurance), as well as the rules by which these economic processes are regulated (e.g., intellectual property rights, structural adjustment requirements, WTO rules).

Transnational corporations (TNCs) are the chief organizing agents of economic globalization (Gilpin, 2000). Because of TNC activity, product design, engineering, production, marketing, and sales (as well as associated financing and other business services) have become more globally dispersed, yet increasingly coordinated and integrated. These activities are supported by the operations of a highly integrated international financial system that provides the necessary liquidity for these dispersed commodity production and distribution activities. A variety of rules have also been enacted over the years to bring a measure of order and predictability into global economic relations. Thus transnational financial, legal, and intellectual property rights regimes (see Leblang & Bernhard, 1999; Maskus, 2000) have taken shape, often in formal organizations like the WTO and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and sometimes in informal arrangements between economically powerful actors (e.g., the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision). These rules are often the outcome of negotiations among nations and groups with substantial differences in power.

One result of these complex processes is a significant and continuous restructuring of the location of economic activities, both within nations and across them. In Chapter 3, Richard Grant and Jan Nijman examine globalization as a geographical–spatial phenomenon in which economic activities are continuously reconfigured and negotiated within countries. Much of the research on globalization has taken the country

as the unit of analysis and compared the 190 or so countries in terms of general indices of gain and loss. A recent recognition by economists (e.g., Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger, 1998) of the (often) dramatic differences within countries is helping to draw attention to the geographical perspectives that have long stressed that globalization's impacts need to be measured in small-area terms, as well as by class, ethnicity, and gender. In their study of India and Ghana, Grant and Nijman show how a "hyperdifferentiation" of space at regional levels and within metropolitan areas can be identified in terms of capital accumulation and levels of prosperity. Winners and losers are easily identified by geographic location.

International trade is an extremely important part of the process of globalization. It is also the subject of contentious views in both the journalistic and the scholarly literatures about the outcomes of the trading system for poor countries, for the well-being of people in poor countries, and for wage earners in the rich countries. (See, e.g., Dollar & Kraay, 2001; Rodrik, 1997; and Stiglitz, 2002.) All too often extreme views dominate the discussion, with one side claiming that the global trading system is and must be a disaster, and the other side claiming that the global trading system is generally a good thing for all. Clearly, a more nuanced position makes more sense, one that recognizes that participation in the global trading system is a precondition for national economic growth, but that the existing rules do not allow the global trading system to benefit all who are involved in it. Three chapters in this section examine the nature of trade, the influence of trade rules on the trading system, and some of the outcomes of the trading systems for societies at different places in the global division of labor. In Chapter 4, Gary Gereffi and Olga Memedovic look at how commodity chains in the apparel industry are organized at the global level, where different countries find themselves in this commodity chain, and how such placements affect the development strategies and possibilities of different nations. Their purpose is to ask whether developing countries ought to try to emulate the successful East Asian development strategy in which production for the clothing industry played a leading role in its early growth strategies for development. They conclude that under certain conditions, such a development strategy makes sense, even in light of common criticisms about the efficacy and equity of low-wage, low-skill, assembly-oriented export production. Gereffi and Memedovic suggest that the secret for sustained economic development for countries at the low end of the apparel commodity chain is to make the transition from simple assembly to full-package production, which involves a move from subcontracting to the design, production, and sale of their own commodities.

In Chapter 5, Keith E. Maskus looks carefully at the world trading

system and the rules under which it operates, and acknowledges that it is wanting in important respects. He argues that in its present form the trade regime is inconsistent with the needs of poor countries for sustained economic development. He suggests that many trade economists, who accept the underlying promise of greater international integration, are nonetheless vitally concerned about the forms in which this integration is taking place. Their dissatisfaction arises from a recognition that WTO agreements contain a far more comprehensive set of rules that limit the ability of governments in poor societies to interfere with trade than did the previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and that these new rules are highly advantageous to powerful economic interests in the rich countries. Maskus argues that trade rules must be made more consistent with the economic development needs of poor countries by making allowances for the special circumstances of each country, by recognizing the costs that these countries are being asked to shoulder, and by rectifying the asymmetry of benefits that flow from existing rules that substantially favor rich countries.

In Chapter 6, Michael W Nicholson considers the impact of the global intellectual property rights regime as it pertains to technology transfers on the development possibilities for poor nations. Like Yang and Maskus (2001), he finds much in the rules of the game that have asymmetrical effects on the economic growth of rich and poor countries, much to the benefit of the former. In particular, he finds that while the existing intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime encourages direct foreign investment by multinational firms in poor countries, it also leaves proprietary control in the hands of the technology innovators in the rich countries. Consequently, the ultimate impact of stronger international IPRs may be a decrease in the transfer of *usable* technology. That is, IPRs provide an incentive for the physical transfer of technology, but with proprietary control (and the associated rents) remaining with multinationals based in the North.

As well as reflecting economic flows, globalization is also about the flow of knowledge and information across national borders (Tomlinson, 1999). Increasingly, knowledge and information are being carried across such borders by mass media and popular entertainment, the Internet, telephony, and educational institutions. Such knowledge and information flows are commonly recognized as a part of life in the rich democracies, but they happen as well in other places. There is mounting evidence, for example, that a massive increase has occurred over the past decade or so in the volume of international telephone traffic, international travel, access to first world-provided television programming and movies, and Internet access in developing and transitional societies (Kearney, 2001). What makes this important is the general agreement among scholars

that knowledge and information carry embedded cultural messages (Calabrese, 1999).

Given the general paucity of systematic empirical research in this area, it is less clear what this flow means for people in different societies (Holton, 2000). Some researchers argue that the mass flow of messages leads to cultural homogenization. Homogenizers suggest that the most important outcome of globalization is the creation of global consumers tied to dreams of affluence, personal success, and sensual gratification as encouraged by advertising, Western television programs and Hollywood films, and growing belief in the superiority of market economies. For those who lament cultural homogenization of this sort, enticement into the consumer culture of the West all too often draws people in developing and transitional societies into lifestyle choices that negatively affect health and human capital development. Many scholars disagree with the homogenizers, suggesting that the flow of information and knowledge more often leads to a clash of cultural values between rich Western countries and poorer societies (Barber, 1995; Huntington, 1996; Said, 1978). Yet a third group of scholars argues for hybridization or synthesis, believing that the flow of knowledge and information from the West mingles with local cultures to produce a synthesis or hybrid form of culture (Hannerz, 1992). In Chapter 7, Andrew Kirby addresses the claim that transborder information flows carry cultural messages that put receiving societies at risk and the notion that cultural globalization is in the hands of a few corporations. He shows that corporations from several countries (especially India, China, and Japan) have joined longer established U.S. companies in producing cultural goods that include movies, videos, music, electronic games, and other entertainment products. The cumulative result is a complex networking of these corporations and a popular culture that remains strongly rooted in the diverse mosaic of the world's populations. Due to the falling price of producing consumer cultural products, there is the likelihood that both a uniformity and a diversity of "global culture" will emerge, perhaps producing a hybridization of cultural products in the world's markets.

GLOBALIZATION'S OUTCOMES: HUMAN WELL-BEING

Globalization is enormously consequential for people and societies at all levels of economic and social development, and no single volume can be expected to cover its entire range. Among the most important outcomes, in our view, are globalization's impact on societal development; patterns in the distribution of income, wealth, and poverty in societies at various levels of economic development; the possibilities for the development of

vibrant civil societies; and the formation of identities, including those associated with opposition to and rejection of globalization itself. In Part III of this book, the authors focus on the effects on individual welfare of globalization processes, while in Part IV, attention is directed to issues of group identity and mobilization, and to evolving definitions of citizenship in a world with increasing numbers of people who move back and forth across borders and who develop a sense of belonging to different governmental units.

Ideology also flows across national boundaries; particularly important in recent years has been the growing influence of the ideologies that shape liberal capitalism. The broad acceptance of these norms—in contradistinction to alternative but discredited systems of ideas such as socialism and the “import substitution” model of development—has had consequences for the shape of social and economic policies in many societies. Many, for example, have reduced the role of government in the economy by moving toward deregulation, privatization, and open national economies (Gilpin, 2000). Though there has been a substantial backlash against this ideology in the midst of the current global economic malaise (as of mid-2003), the core ideas of liberal capitalism continue to guide the actions of the U.S. government and its agencies, as well as the global financial institutions it dominates, including the IMF and the World Bank. Two of the more dramatic trends since the fall of the communist regimes in 1989–1991 have been the perceived lack of a viable alternative to this “Washington Consensus” and the eagerness of successive U.S. administrations to promote worldwide democracy (O’Loughlin, in press).

Globalization has numerous complex and interrelated effects on the economic welfare of individuals and communities in those countries that embrace it (Ranis, Stewart, & Ramirez, 2000). By forcing a reallocation of resources and providing access to newer technologies from abroad, aggregate (national) incomes ordinarily would be expected to increase, at least over time. This substantially affects the ability of governments in the poorer parts of the world to meet the welfare, health, and educational needs of their citizens. Key political choices must be made about how open the economy should be to foreign investment and imported goods; to the relative spending levels on welfare, which in turn dictates a certain level of taxation; to the balance between business and consumer interests; and to long-term (e.g., education, infrastructure) versus short-term (e.g., police, telecommunications) investment.

Though some economists disagree (e.g., Rodrik, 1997), considerable evidence to date supports theoretical expectations that integration into global economic networks contributes to aggregate gains in a country’s GDP over time (Bhagwati, 2002; Bhalla, 2002; Dollar & Kraay,

2000). However, the pace at which a country would see its incomes go up depends on specific circumstances and the sequencing of its liberalization. For example, it is unlikely that a society with weak financial institutions would find it advantageous to open itself fully to international financial flows because the potential volatility of exchange rates and interest rates could be devastating in the short run (Stiglitz, 2002). In Chapter 8, Michael D. Ward and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch show that a society's degree of integration into the global economy—in this case, measured by trade and economic openness—has significant positive impacts on its economic growth rate and on the reduction of aggregate poverty. They recognize that the benefits of globalization vary by global region (former Soviet and African countries lag), but they conclude that the advantages of globalization are evident in the example of Peru's experience and in their statistical evidence that globalization promotes democratization. In turn, they suggest that democratization adds to the number of countries that are less likely to fight international conflicts with other democratic states.

However, increases in aggregate measures, such as GDP, tell us little about the distribution of income, wealth, and other advantages in any particular society. It may be the case, for example, that even income-enhancing globalization can have significant adverse impacts on the distribution of income and wealth, and on the levels of poverty. Standard international trade theory argues that poor countries should observe a decline in poverty after opening themselves up to trade and investment precisely because it is the abundance of unskilled (poor) workers that provides them with a comparative advantage. However, this statement is logically true only under particular circumstances of competition, technologies, and preferences. A more trenchant claim is that individuals (and communities) that offer skills that are poorly suited to compete in the global economy will suffer reductions in real income. Similarly, if workers' jobs are tied to the use of natural resources, the price of which falls with trade liberalization, they can experience large income declines. In Chapter 9, J. David Richardson examines globalization's impact in the United States with reference to individual welfare in the form of employment and income. Adopting a balance-sheet approach that is designed to counter impressionistic accounts of the effects of globalization, he shows that marginal groups do not benefit from the increasing globalization of the U.S. economy as much as do skilled and managerial workers. However, globalization cannot be blamed for the stagnation or even the falling standard of living of poor Americans. Instead, it is technological change that is more responsible for job dislocation. Richardson, however, is well aware of the significant differences by job sector and skill/educational level and proposes that government insurance pro-

grams be instituted to help displaced workers cope with job losses. He is cognizant of the variable effects of globalization within U.S. society and argues that careful calculations of the losses and gains by each group and region should allow for more careful consideration in the political debate of balancing interests. Whether this can be accomplished in the increasingly partisan and vociferous domestic political debate, however, is questionable.

It appears increasingly that globalization has consequences for the health of a society's population. According to *The World Health Report 2002*, "it should be recognized that health itself has become globalized" (World Health Organization, 2002, p. 5). Certain key features of globalization—the liberalization of international trade, increased international travel and migration, and pervasive exposure to Western mass media—have had reverberating implications for health, especially in developing countries. Infectious diseases can now be spread from country to country in a matter of days or even hours. And as that same report noted, the lifestyles of whole populations are changing around the world in ways that are consequential for global health—lifestyle changes having to do with food consumption, tobacco and alcohol use, and diminished physical activity, among others. Together, these trends are seen as constituting a "risk transition," one that now places "a double burden of disease on developing countries—the combination of long-established infectious diseases [e.g., malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS], and the greater relative importance of chronic, non-communicable diseases [e.g., cancer, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes]" (World Health Organization, 2002, p. xviii).

Although there has been a salutary global decrease in infant mortality and an increase in life expectancy, physical health continues to be compromised by poverty and malnutrition, poor sanitation, substance abuse (especially tobacco and alcohol use), violence, and sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. The World Health Organization report designates undernutrition as the leading cause of disease burden and a major cause of death among children: "It was a contributing factor in 60% of all child deaths in developing countries" (2002, p. xv). Michael E. Shin addresses several of these issues in Chapter 10. Dramatic improvements in overall global health in the past half-century have masked some strong regional differences and new challenges in the forms of infectious disease diffusion and the chronic health problems of the growing elderly segment of rich countries. Shin shows that globalization (increasing trade openness) leads to increased wealth, which in turn leads to increased health and longer life expectancy, although the benefits are not evenly distributed between or within countries. While the relationship between globalization and health has evolved over a long time

and shows macrostructural developments, the recent outbreak of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in East Asia in 2003 illustrates well the rapidity with which infectious diseases can now spread in an age of cheap long-distance air travel. In turn, endemic disease has a deleterious effect on regional economic output (the dramatic drops in output in parts of southern Africa as a result of the high rates of HIV-infected adult males is well known), and panic in the face of new diseases can also set back globalization's advances, as Shin's example of Hong Kong shows.

Globalization may also have an impact on a society's ability to provide educational, medical, and income support benefits if, in the effort to remain globally competitive, societies must cut taxes on business firms, reduce the regulatory load on businesses, and reduce government's role in society and economy. In Chapter 11, George Avelino, David S. Brown, and Wendy Hunter address these issues with respect to the Latin American countries. They argue that most of the work on globalization and welfare spending has reflected the situation in rich countries and that work on poor regions like Latin America is needed in order to complete the picture. The "Washington Consensus" posits that economic growth follows on neoliberal policies that promote government efficiency—especially by reducing taxes and in keeping government small. But citizens, especially in increasingly democratic societies, demand that their governments provide welfare, often in the form of food subsidies, free education, free health care, and adequate public transportation. The authors stress the careful use of statistics, since the debate about the relative advantages of the equity (welfare) versus efficiency (trade openness and low taxes) model for societies is replete with authors using widely fluctuating numbers and definitions. Without resolving the efficiency/compensation debate, Avelino, Brown, and Hunter conclude that intermediate factors such as the relative importance of trade unionism, the democratic nature of the regime, and the regional setting are important determinants of the outcome of globalization on social welfare.

GLOBALIZATION'S OUTCOMES: CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL SOCIETY

By the turn of the 21st century, few political leaders—even in authoritarian states—were willing to argue aloud against democracy, since its virtues were almost universally accepted (Diamond, 1999, p. 4). Moreover, global norms and conventions supportive of key human and political freedoms associated with democracy have been coalescing, starting with the United Nations' "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (1948),

and extending to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. The issue, however, is whether human rights protections and democratic political arrangements are becoming more common as societies become more integrated into the global system, and further if the institutional and cultural foundations for human rights and democracy are firmly in place. In short, the debate has moved beyond the procedural aspects of democratization to consider more of the substantive questions of what it means to be a democratic citizen and the contexts and conditions that are necessary to support citizenship in varied settings.

Similar to the growing concern about globalization in many circles, some actors and groups in developing and transitional societies have begun to question the efficacy of democratic forms of governance, or at least the attenuated and distorted forms that democracy has taken in some of these societies (e.g., Uzbekistan, Russia, Ukraine, and the Philippines [Zakaria, 2003; O'Loughlin, in press]). Democracy, at least in its liberal democratic form, is being looked at more skeptically. New political voices are being raised, questioning the models of democracy on offer, asking who they benefit, and querying what they assume about political subjects. They ask who is promoting liberal, procedural versions of democracy and for what purposes? Related to these topics is the specific issue of the rights of people who are recent residents of the receiving country. The movement of people, both within societies and across national boundaries, is a phenomenon that is both stimulated by other globalization processes and an essential part of the globalization phenomenon.

Many of the authors of this book have stressed the differential impacts of globalization within the states of the world system, either by class, region, or by involvement with the global economy. If a society finds that inequality grows as a function of differential incorporation into the world economy along ethnic lines, existing polarization can be magnified and in turn threaten the stability of the state itself. Theories of nationalist mobilization have increasingly turned to explanations that rely on social constructionist arguments—while it is helpful to a nationalist movement to have predefined lines in terms of race or ethnicity in order to build a movement, nationalist activists can point to inequalities. In this part, we include seven chapters that address issues of cultural and political identity, grassroots mobilization, and the intersection of the interests of national states and their new residents in locations as diverse as Ecuador, Mexico, Okinawa, Turkey, and the United States. Of particular concern are the changes associated with globalization and their effects on the ways in which people are able to claim—and conceptualize—citizenship. By this, we do not only mean how individuals understand the legal category of citizen, though this is clearly important. Rather, we

intend a broader conceptualization of how individuals and social groups understand their rights and identities as political subjects. If the role of the nation-state is changing in response to globalization—as Mittelman suggests in Chapter 2—then we should anticipate that new forms of—or claims to—political identity may emerge. The chapters in this part of the book address this possibility.

A theoretical starting point shared by many of the authors is that the effects of globalization are likely to be differentiated. Since social groups are variously positioned within and between countries, it makes sense to expect that the *experience* of globalization on subjectivity is likely to be uneven as local and global forces and identities interact; in this perspective, most of the authors are sympathetic to the kinds of arguments put forward by Grant and Nijman (Chapter 3). Collectively, the authors demonstrate the ways in which specific effects of globalization interact with institutions at the national and local levels to shape the ways in which globalization is experienced, made sense of, and sometimes acted upon by social groups in different circumstances. If globalization is a protoparadigm, then one element of this paradigm must be the effects on political identities and citizens.

In Chapter 12, Caroline Nagel examines the effects of migration on debates about citizenship. While citizenship is at one level a legal category, debates about citizenship can be used as a marker of how a society defines itself and the people who live within its territory. Nagel argues that migration is only one of many flows associated with globalization, but it is the one in which questions of identity at a societal scale have been crystallized. Using both theoretical arguments and public debates within Western countries, Nagel demonstrates the ways in which various narratives of citizenship and belonging have been used to frame normative expectations of how migrants *should* fit into the societies to which they have moved. But she also shows that in most of these debates the perspectives of the migrants themselves are often absent. Drawing from interviews with Arab migrants to the United States and the United Kingdom, she argues that migrants use other forms of globalization—specifically the flows of information—to express ideas about citizenship based on the complex relations between host and sending societies. Thus globalization may facilitate complex political identities not adequately captured through statecentric models of citizenship.

The dislocations of globalization are not only experienced by international migrants, but also by populations who move within their countries and by people whose worlds seem to shift around them due to institutional changes mandated by international actors. In Chapter 13, Victoria A. Lawson traces the effects of international political and economic changes on the national government, on firms, and on workers in

Ecuador. In this, her analysis stands in contrast to that provided in Ward and Gleditsch's laudatory account of economic growth and the effects of inequality in Peru (Chapter 8). Lawson documents changes in the Ecuadorian state's fiscal and social welfare policies in response to pressures from the IMF and the World Bank; she then uses the accounts of labor migrants who left rural areas of Ecuador in order to understand how the dislocations of globalization affected this already impoverished sector of society. Lawson notes that many of these migrants express faith in the project of modernization, but that they also express a sense of exclusion from it that is both economic and political. In response, many of these migrants are nostalgic for the rural communities they left. Rather than a global or even a national identity, these workers articulate a spatial and political identity connected with their locality, but that remains isolated from efforts to build new political identities from the grass roots (see Mittelman, Chapter 2, this volume).

As Lawson suggests, identity formation in the context of globalization is a complex process that is expressed in many different ways and that reflects tensions between different globalization processes. In Chapter 14, Anna J. Secor further examines this argument through an analysis of the sources of support for Islamist politics among middle- and working-class men and women in Istanbul. Like Lawson, Secor believes that the political, economic, and informational flows associated with globalization are implicated in new political movements and identities. Through surveys and focus groups, Secor questions the ways in which Islamists use narratives of globalization in their political campaigns and the ways in which these are incorporated into residents' political outlooks and identification. Secor demonstrates that the role of globalization with regard to political support for Islamist politics varies by gender, reflecting the differentiated ways in which globalization is experienced—sometimes creating openings and sometimes creating conditions supporters find alarming or dangerous. While both women and men who voted for Islamist candidates express a religious identity, the influences of globalization on support are minimal at an aggregate level, although there are strong gender differences that are further cross-cut by class. Most importantly, support for Islamist candidates seems to be affected by the different engagements with globalization for women and men. Thus Secor concludes that the effects of globalization on political identities are not easily predicted and that they do not easily fit within the narratives of globalization theorists.

While the first three chapters of this part consider some of the dislocations of globalization, the next two chapters consider the ways in which emerging institutional structures may shape people's abilities to forge identities and to act politically. These chapters take up the pressing

questions of how procedures instituted as part of a move to greater democratization can be made more effective.

In many countries around the world institutions have been built in the name of providing better channels for the citizenry to engage in debate and to force a measure of accountability onto their leaders. These institutional reforms have often been mandated by international donor agencies as a condition of receiving aid. Other institutions and practices have been established by nongovernmental organizations in an attempt to involve community members in decision making. Yet Lawson's analysis shows that these efforts are not always successful, as the migrants she interviewed remained unconnected to these structures and institutions.

In Chapter 15, Patricia M. Martin examines the recent trends toward greater democracy and participation in Mexican politics. While she notes the important steps being made toward greater electoral openness, she questions whether these have been complemented by opportunities for debate, for opinion formation, and for the development of social movements. Drawing on arguments from Habermas (1989), Fraser (1995), and feminist theorists, Martin explores the opportunities for an active citizenship; she is particularly interested in the scales at which new public spheres may operate, including the local, national, and global. She finds that activists engage in debate and mobilization at various scales, but that their sense of the scales at which public spheres operate are primarily local and global, not national. Although these emerging public spheres do not converge with the formal bounds of the Mexican state, activists believe—or perhaps hope—that they will provide leverage for rethinking political life and the paths that further democratization may follow. Thus these new public spheres may prove influential in the deepening of democracy in Mexico, and give greater meaning and substance to political life than procedures alone can do.

As Martin demonstrates, civil society has in many ways become a central arena from which new ideas about democracy, citizenship, and political identity may emerge. In the best of circumstances, civil society is believed to be a wellspring of trust—of social capital—that can be mobilized to solve problems that communities face. It is this willingness to work together, to balance collective and individual interests, that is said to make governments and other institutions solve collective needs—or in Putnam's (1993) term, to “make democracy work.”

In an effort to “speed up” the processes of democratization and economic development, many organizations have attempted to produce social capital within civil society. In Chapter 16, William Muck examines the efforts and efficacy of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in artificially inducing the development of social capital. These organizations attempt to stimulate

intracommunity, extracommunity, and state–society networks in order to bring isolated or marginalized populations into the globalized system. Muck argues that because social capital is multidimensional, efforts should be directed at engaging all aspects of social capital in order to be successful. He concludes that concerted efforts on the part of state, IGO, and NGO agents are required to enhance civil society and to improve prospects for development.

As noted, many of the authors in this book have stressed the differential impacts of globalization, either by class, gender, region, or involvement with the global economy. If a society finds that inequality grows as a function of differential incorporation into the world economy along ethnic lines, existing polarization within civil society can be magnified and in turn threaten the stability of the state itself; in some cases, social capital can be turned against the more laudatory ends discussed by Muck. Theories of nationalist mobilization have increasingly turned to explanations that rely on social constructionist arguments—while it is helpful to a nationalist movement to have predefined lines in terms of race or ethnicity in order to build a movement, nationalist activists can point to inequalities in income, welfare, government support, or educational opportunity to build a protest movement. Additionally, in the face of a challenge to traditional state identity and definition from cultural products and changing consumer preferences allied to materialist interests, traditionalists often appeal to historic identities to rally support against globalization or to use its impacts to redefine their community, including drawing the lines of who qualifies for membership and who does not.

Benjamin Barber (1995) contrasted these tensions as a choice between “Jihad” (traditionalism) and “McWorld (globalization) and Thomas Friedman (2001) chose the “Lexus” (globalization) and the “olive tree” (traditional community) as his analogy. Two examples of the globalized–localized tension close out the book. In Chapter 17, Takashi Yamazaki examines the experience of Okinawa, an island chain in the south of Japan, in the face of an economic crisis beginning in the 1970s at a time when Japan was fully globalizing. As the site for massive U.S. military bases, Okinawans chafed at U.S. control. After Japan regained autonomy over the island chain, the key choice was to try to “go it alone” as an offshore node in the global economic network, emulating the example of Hong Kong, or to integrate fully into Japan in expectations of Tokyo government largesse to improve the quality of life in Japan’s poorest province. Within the Okinawan population, the political debate became rancorous as local activists tried to use the recently mobilized ethnic identity to push the separation option by “riding on global-

ization,” while using the widespread opposition to the U.S. military presence as a vehicle for promotion of their strategy. After initial success, the effort failed in the face of concerted Japanese government aims to persuade Okinawans of the long-term economic benefits of integration into the national economy. The power of government and the ability of the state to use its resources to pursue its policies, coupled with the competition from other East Asian locations and the changing economic fortunes of Japanese corporations, undermined regional attempts to renegotiate relations with the national, regional, and world economies.

It is only appropriate that we return to the situation in the global hegemon, the United States, to end the book. In the decade after the collapse of the communist alternative, the United States had seen enormous growth in its global power, presence, and prestige, as well as dramatic economic growth at home spurred by investment in a high-tech economy. Commentators crowed about the fate of Japan, once a putative challenger to U.S. dominance, but now mired in recession and stagnation since 1993. The twin shocks of the stock market collapse in 2000 and the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in September 2001 forced a debate in American society about the U.S. role in a globalized world order. In Chapter 18, Colin Flint uses a world systems approach to examine the “hegemonic dilemma,” defined as the choice facing the United States as the most important (and in many ways, the most open) of the globalized states of pushing the globalization agenda as it had while defending its obviously porous borders. The United States is an “extraterritorial” power with global interests, evidently present in all corners of the world. Whether the United States is an empire, now widely discussed (Ferguson, 2003), hardly matters; the tensions among Americans are showing signs of a growing cleavage around this balance of global and domestic interests. Groups that have traditionally been part of the social compact, such as trade unionists and rural Southerners who have bought into the prime modernity of the U.S. project of global leadership and worldwide presence, are now becoming increasingly uneasy with this project despite the strenuous attempts by the Bush administration to push a globalization strategy as the best economic option for the United States. Whether the balance can be maintained in favor of the “extraterritorial” strategy is now problematic; key political decisions need to be made starting with the 2004 presidential election about where to fix the level of immigration, which parts of the globe demand most attention, where to set the government spending ratio of guns to butter, and where to assert domestic welfare interests of workers and communities against the interest of U.S. transnational corporations. The outcome of these political choices will shape the face of U.S. globalization for decades.

CONCLUSIONS

As the chapters in this book demonstrate, globalization is a complex, interlocking set of processes that is not reducible to one trend or manifested in one outcome. As the individual authors of the chapters demonstrate, the outcomes of globalization are multiple, apparently taking different forms and holding different implications depending on the aspect one examines, the level of analysis, and the groups and settings under consideration. Furthermore, and as some of the authors have suggested, the analysis of globalization benefits from an approach that historicizes processes, such that an effect at one point in time is not solidified or finalized as an “outcome.” Rather, processes of globalization continuously shape and reshape the societies in which we live.

It is in this spirit that we refuse to make a final assessment of globalization, other than to say it is complicated and ongoing. Any other kind of assessment would not reflect the spirited debates that are reflected in these chapters, or even the diverging assessments between us as editors. All we can conclude is that globalization is complex, unpredictable, subject to shocks, but undeniably important to the ways in which people live their lives and participate in societies around the world.

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